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This paper develops a modest proposal for introducing final outcome indicators in the 
IDA aid allocation formula. It starts with a review of the current formula and the rationale 
for it. It is argued that this formula, and in particular the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) part of it, implicitly relies too heavily on a uniform model of what 
works in development policy. Even if this model were valid "on average", the variations 
around the average make it an unreliable sole guide to the country-specific productivity of 
aid in achieving the final objectives of development. Rather, it is argued that changes in the 
actual outcomes on these final objectives could also be used as part of the allocation 
formula. A number of conceptual and operational objections to this position are considered 
and debated. The paper concludes that there is much to be gained by taking small steps in 
the direction of introducing outcome variables in the IDA formula, and assessing the 
experience of doing so in a few years' time. 
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 How should aid donors allocate aid between recipient countries if their objective is 
to advance development?1  This question poses both conceptual and operational issues. 
All donors have rules and procedures that feed into the determination of the level and 
composition of aid transfers to different recipients.  In many cases there is an explicit 
formula which, while not determining in a mechanical sense, certainly sets the 
benchmarks from which the allocation decision begins.  One such formula is the IDA 
allocation formula, but other donors have procedures that are similar in spirit. 
 
A very simple framework would suggest the importance of two key factors in the 
allocation choice between potential recipient countries.  First, how successful would 
this aid be in aiding development?  Second, how is the development in one country to 
be valued against that in another?  The first is an “aid productivity” question.  The 
second is a “valuation of outcomes” question.  The second question is relatively easy to 
answer if the donor’s valuation of development in recipient countries is clear.  Given 
the development outcomes the donor is interested in, for example a reduction in infant 
mortality rates, a natural specification of the valuation is that a unit improvement 
should be valued more the worse is the starting point.  Thus, roughly speaking, for any 
given degree of aid productivity, aid allocation should vary inversely with the level of 
development of a country (the exact relationship would need a closer specification of 
the valuation function). 
 
                                                 
1 For overviews of the aid literature, see Tarp (2000) or Kanbur (2003). 
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 The question on valuation of development outcomes is not without its 
complexities.2  But it can be argued that, at least to some extent and especially in the 
wake of the consensus on the Millennium Development goals (MDGs), the 
international community has something of an idea of what it values as the outcome of 
development.  Rather, it is the first question that has vexed aid analysts and 
practitioners alike, because the productivity of aid is not independent of the modalities 
of aid delivery and the usage of that aid.  The arc of thinking has traversed a project 
oriented phase, where the outcomes of specific projects were the guide to aid allocation, 
and a policy oriented phase, where the policy parameters of the recipient country were 
seen as a better guide to the productivity of aid.  The discussion has often been cast in 
terms of the much used, and abused, term “conditionality.” 
 
 At its most general, conditionality is nothing more than the rules and procedures 
according to which a donor transfers resources to a recipient.  To be against 
conditionality in general doesn’t make sense.  The devil really is in the detail—the 
detail of the rules and procedures according to which aid is allocated and disbursed.3  
And these rules and procedures kick in at different levels, in the overall resource 
envelope allocated to a country, in the division of this envelope between different types 
of assistance, for example project or program modalities, and in the specific conditions 
that apply to particular projects or programs. 
 
                                                 
2 See Kanbur (2004a) 
3 For a discussion of conditionality in the context of the history of development assistance, see Kanbur 
(2003). 
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 This paper is about the logic used in deciding the allocation of the overall aid 
resource envelope for a country.  Since total resources are finite, such allocation has to 
be based, explicitly or implicitly, on a comparison of relevant features of different 
recipient countries. Perhaps the most prominent such method for comparison is the IDA 
allocation formula, not simply in terms of the total volume of resources that are 
allocated but because it is generally recognized that IDA procedures have a strong 
influence on the procedures of other donors as well.  The component that is of specific 
interest in this paper is the method of cross-country comparison, the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) formula.  The paper considers the logic of this 
formula, and proposes a revision to it.4 
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 outlines the IDA allocation procedure 
and the role of the CPIA in this procedure.  Section 3 discusses the logic behind the use 
of the CPIA and offers a critique.  Section 4 proposes allocations based on development 
outcomes and debates the major criticisms of this approach.  Section 5 concludes by 
offering a modest revision of the CPIA as the first step to moving towards a 
development outcomes based approach. 
                                                 
4 There are, of course, many aspects of the development assistance process that are important but are not 
covered in this paper, for example, the sometimes perverse incentives in aid agencies to move money rather 
than focus on the best use of that money, or the interplay between foreign policy objectives and development 
objectives in the realpolitik of development assistance allocations. Also, my specific focus is on IDA, so I 
will not be discussing formulae used by other agencies such as the European Union, DFID or USAID. 
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2. Outline of the IDA Formula5 
 
At the core of the logic of the IDA allocation process is a balance between “needs” 
and “performance”.  Needs are measured straightforwardly by national income per capita, 
GNIPC.  Performance is measured by a performance rating, PR, which is the focus of this 
paper.  The allocation per capita for a country is a function of GNIPC and PR.  In fact, the 
specific relationship is (World Bank 2003a): 
 
 Allocation per capita = f ( PR2.0, GNIPC -0.125 ) 
  
Thus the performance rating is raised to the square power and per capita income is raised to 
a negative power, minus 0.125, and these two are then combined to decide the allocation.  
The function f (  ) is chosen to reflect the fact individual country allocations have to add up 
to the total resources available.  A feature to note is that the performance rating has a much 
higher weight than the measure of needs.  But this is not our major concern in this paper. 
Rather, the focus is on how the PR index is constructed and the logic behind this 
construction. 
 
Before turning to the PR index, some further clarifications on how the above formula is 
used.  The allocation per capita derived above is not a hard and fixed amount, but rather a 
“norm”.  The detailed determination of the allocation, and of the composition of this 
                                                 
5 The procedures and the formula are summarized in World Bank (2003a) World Bank (2003b) and updated 
in World Bank (2004a). 
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allocation between different types of assistance, is done in the Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS).  To quote World Bank (2003a): 
 
 “The allocation norm establishes the financial resources available for each IDA country for the 
following three fiscal years.  The allocation sets the resource envelope that each country could expect to 
receive if its performance stays the same and assuming a pipeline of quality projects -- but is not an 
entitlement.  In the case of a new CAS the allocation norm will set the base-case financing scenario….The 
CAS financing scenarios may be adjusted to reflect special country circumstances, which will be spelled out 
in the CAS.” (World Bank, 2003a, p2). 
 
Moreover, there are a number of exceptions to the norm derived above: 
 
 “In addition to their performance-based allocations, all countries are allotted a basic allocation of 
SDR 3 million (about US $ 4 million). In terms of per capita allocations, this benefits in particular the small 
states.  There are some important considerations that merit exceptions to the allocation norms.  First, “blend” 
countries with access, or potential access, to IBRD receive less than their norm allocation due to their broader 
financing options.  Second, post-conflict countries can, when appropriate, be provided with additional 
resources in support of their recovery and in recognition of a period of exceptional need.  And third, 
additional allocations may be provided in the aftermath of major natural disasters.” (World Bank, 2003a, p2). 
 
However, despite these caveats, the allocation norm, and the performance rating that 
underlies it, is a central feature of the whole process. 
 
 How is the PR index derived?  At the heart of it is the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA).  The procedure for 2003 is as follows (the 2004 
procedure has some changes that are noted below).  Essentially, this is an assessment of a 
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country on each of twenty items divided into four categories, as shown in Table 1.  Each of 
these items is then scored by Bank staff on a scale from 1 (low) through 6 (high).  The 
broad interpretations of these scores are given in Table 2.  The specific guidelines are 
elaborated in the 2003 CPIA questionnaire: 
 
 “Countries should be rated on their current status in relation to these guidelines and to the 
benchmark countries in each region, for which the agreed ratings have been provided to the staff.  Please 
assess the countries on the basis of their currently observable policies, and not on the amount of improvement 
since last year nor on intentions for future change, unless the latter are virtually in place…. As described in 
these guidelines, a “5” rating corresponds to a status that is good today.  If this level has been sustained for 
three or more years, a “6” is warranted, signifying a proven commitment to and support for the policy. 
Similarly, a “2” rating represents a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation today.  A “1” rating signifies that this 
low level has persisted for three or more years, and therefore that the resulting problems are likely to be more 
entrenched and intractable.” (World Bank, 2003b, pp 1-2.) 
 
Finally, a simple unweighted average of these scores is taken to give the CPIA index. 
Individual country scores are not released to the public, only country quintiles are made 
available (this is slated to change in 2005).  The results for 2003 are given in Table 3. 
 
 Before turning to the specific categories and the scoring criteria for them, it is worth 
specifying how exactly the CPIA feeds into the PR.  First the CPIA is combined with the 
Bank’s Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP), the weights being 80% for 
CIPA, 20% for ARPP.  Then this weighted average is multiplied by a “governance factor”. 
The governance factor is built up as follows.  First, an unweighted average is taken of the 
scores for six governance-related criteria in the CPIA,  #4 and #16-20 (see Table 1), and of 
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a seventh score, on the “procurement practices” criterion from the ARPP assessment 
process (since it is not the focus in this paper, the ARPP process is not discussed in any 
further detail).  This average score is then divided by 3.5 (the mid-point of the 1-6 scoring 
range), and this ratio is raised to the power of 1.5.  This procedure effectively ends up 
giving significantly greater weight overall to the governance criteria in the CPIA.  (Note 
that this is the procedure for 2003.  For 2004, a revised procedure was adopted, as set out in 
World Bank, 2004a). 
 
 The components of the CPIA are thus central building blocks in the whole process. 
There are specific guidelines for the scoring of each of the 20 items that make up the CPIA.  
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 lay out these guidelines for one component from each of the four major 
categories in the CPIA: Fiscal Policy under Economic Management, Trade Policy and 
Foreign Exchange Regime under Structural Policies, Equity of Public Resource Use under 
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity, and Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in 
the Public Sector under Public Sector Management and Institutions.  Note that guidelines 
are specified only for scores of 2 (unsatisfactory), 3 (moderately unsatisfactory), 4 
(moderately satisfactory), 5 (good); a score of 1 is simply “unsatisfactory for an extended 
period” and a score of 6 is “good for an extended period”. 
 
 Finally, we note that in 2004 certain changes to the CPIA process were accepted by 
World Bank management (see World Bank, 2004a).  Among these are to disclose CPIA 
scores from 2005 onwards and to establish an independent expert standing committee to 
review the CPIA methodology every three years.  These movements are greatly to be 
 9
welcomed.  In addition, the governance factor calculation was changed, and the number of 
CPIA categories was reduced to 16, as given in Table 8.  However, albeit with new 
categories, and a new procedure for calculating the governance factor, the essence of the 
CPIA method and the IDA allocation formula are left unchanged. 
 
 This completes the outline description of the IDA formula, and its centerpiece, the 
CPIA scores.  What is the logic underlying this method of aid allocation?  We turn now to 
this question. 
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3. The Logic of the Formula, and a Critique 
 
 There are many specific and operational criticisms of the IDA allocation process. 
The CPIA is done behind closed doors by Bank staff, with little or no scrutiny from outside 
independent observers (slated to change in 2005).  The ARPP remains an under scrutinized 
assessment procedure, linked as it is to internal Bank procedures.  The way the 
“governance factor” enters the formula is convoluted at best.  And it is not all clear where 
the different weights and exponents used in various parts of the formula come from.  Why, 
for example, is PR raised to the power 2, while the governance score ratio is raised to a 
power of 1.5 to give the governance factor?  Why exactly is GNIPC raised to the power of 
minus 0.125?  But the main concern in this paper is not with these specifics—any formula 
will have to make such operational specifications and defend them the best it can.  Rather, 
our concern is with the fundamental logic of the process. 
 
As noted in the introduction, any logic for allocating development assistance 
resources to a poor country must have two components—how much the assistance can be 
translated into improvements in outcomes that the donor cares about (“aid productivity” or 
“performance”), and how much the donor values these improvements in outcomes 
(“need”).  Thus if D is a measures of the final development outcomes and W(D) is the 
donor’s valuation of it, then the impact of aid A can be written mathematically as: 
 
dW/dA  =  [δW/δD] x [δD/δA] = Need For Aid x Productivity of Aid (1) 
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The first term on the right hand side values development outcomes as seen by the donor, 
while the second term measures the impact of a unit of aid on development outcomes, in 
other words, its productivity.  If the value the donor places on the outcomes declines as the 
outcome improves, then the need dimension can be captured by an inverse function of the 
level of the desired variable.  In the IDA allocation formula this is done simply by taking 
the per capita national income of a country and raising it to the power of minus 0.125. 
Wealthier countries will get lower allocations through this component of the formula.  Thus 
the IDA formula essentially captures need through the income criterion, and does not go 
directly to indicators such as infant mortality, maternal mortality, girls’ education and other 
components of the MDGs, through which the international community has presumably 
expressed its objectives of the development process—the outcome variables that it is 
interested in.  However, we will set this aspect of the IDA formula to one side, since the 
main focus in this paper is on the way that performance is measured. 
 
 Conceptually, if we hold the needs part of the formula constant then more aid 
should flow where its impact on objectives is greatest.  If we could identify environments 
where aid productivity is highest, in other words where improvements in final development 
outcomes of interest, per unit of aid flow, would be greatest, then more aid should be 
allocated to those environments.  Presumably the performance rating part of the IDA 
formula, and specifically the CPIA component of it, attempts to identify high aid 
productivity environments.  The logic must be that a higher score on any of the twenty 
components of the CPIA enhances the productivity of aid flow and therefore argues for 
greater aid flow.  These scores are then aggregated with equal weights cross the twenty 
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categories.  There are two possible logics behind this last step.  The argument could be that 
the twenty categories are equally valuable to aid productivity, or the argument could be that 
we have no information on the relative contribution of each category to overall aid 
productivity so, on the principle of insufficient reason, each category should be given equal 
weight.  
 
But perhaps the most striking yet least remarked upon feature of the PR formula, 
and especially the CPIA part of it, is that it is the same for every country.  The twenty 
categories are the same for each country, the guidelines for what gets a high score in each 
category are the same for every country, and the weighting scheme across the twenty scores 
(equal weighting) is the same for every country.  What could be the logic behind this 
uniformity in country treatment? 
 
One way to uncover the logic is to consider the literature on “cross-country growth 
regressions”, not least because this literature has had a tremendous influence in thinking on 
development strategies and aid strategies.  In this literature, economic growth in a country 
is seen as a function of a number of determining variables.  If growth rate is G then growth 
in country i is given by: 
 
 Gi  =  α + βYi +θXi + γAi +  ηXiAi+ εi   (2) 
 
where Y is a vector of structural variables that the government cannot control (such as a 
country’s geography and climate), X is vector of policy variables (like fiscal deficit, tariffs, 
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percentage of government expenditure devoted to primary education, or independence of 
judiciary) and ε is a classical stochastic error term.  The coefficients in α, β, θ, and η 
translate the impact of their respect variables to growth.  Thus according to the world view 
implicit in equation (2), a country’s growth depends upon structural features that the 
government cannot control, policy variables that the government can control, aid flows, and 
an interaction term between aid flows and these same policy variables.  This is, sometimes 
quite literally, the family of regressions that have been run over and over again in the 
literature, including the well known contribution of Dollar and Burnside (2000), and 
subsequent large numbers of papers by other authors.6  While a relationship like (2) is most 
often estimated for growth as the variable to be explained, there is no reason why in 
regression analysis the dependent variable cannot be, as it sometimes is, another 
development outcome variable like the infant mortality rate or life expectancy.  Then we 
would simply replace Gi with Di.  
 
There are a host of data and econometric problems associated with estimating an 
equation like (2), but they are not my main focus and I want to set those aside for now.  But 
one point to emphasize is that (2) sees no role for the aid flows themselves to influence 
policy, in other words, it sees no role for conditionality in changing government policy.  
This is surely right, because if the experience of two decades has taught us anything, it is 
that the development assistance tail cannot wag the domestic political economy dog.  
Rather, we should take the policies as emerging out of the domestic political economy, and 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Hansen and Tarp (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003). See also the survey in Kanbur (2003). 
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take them as givens in the aid allocation decision.7  If a relationship like (2) does indeed 
hold in a cross section of countries, then the implications for aid allocation are clear, since 
in mathematical expectation,  
 
  
 δGi/δAi  =  γ + ηXi     (3) 
 
The productivity of aid is then given by the right hand side of (3), and we see there the 
values of the policy variables in country i, the elements of the vector Xi, weighted by the 
elements of the vector η, which are estimated from the regression run on cross-country 
data.  The logic of the IDA formula is now clear. Equation (2), and its derivative, equation 
(3), lead to the scoring function given in the right hand side of (3).  This tells you which 
policies should be counted (the elements of Xi ) and how they should be weighted (the 
elements of η). 
 
 Having laid bare the logic, let us consider it further.  The basic point is that the 
scoring rule in (3) is only as valid as the underlying model in (2) and its econometric 
estimation.  First of all, it is not clear that anybody has ever run a regression with the 
twenty policy categories in the IDA formula, using the scores for policies as exemplified in 
Tables 4-7 to generate the elements of Xi, and even if they did, it is almost certain that they 
would not get a result where the elements of η were all equal, thereby giving the equal 
weighting rule.  Rather, the categories in the IDA formula reflect an accretion of factors 
                                                 
7 In fact, in Burnside and Dollar (2000) a jointly estimated equation testing for the impact of aid on policies 
finds no such relationship. On conditionality, there is of course a huge literature. For example, see 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1995), Kanbur (2000, 2003),  and Adam et.al (2003). 
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thought to be important to the development process, under different arguments made in 
different contexts.  The equal weighting of the different factors then really does reflect the 
“principle of insufficient reason”, rather than a reasoned logic leading to particular 
combination of key policy factors that impact on the productivity of aid. 
 
 But perhaps most important is the fact that a common scoring rule for all countries, 
which is what (3) is, depends upon a common development outcomes model, for all 
countries.  Put another way, Equation (2) effectively assumes that all factors explaining 
outcome variations across countries have been successfully accounted for in the variable 
included in equation 1.  And the effect of an explanatory variable on development 
outcomes is identical across countries.  Any variation across countries over and above that 
accounted for by the explanatory variables is purely random, not amenable to further 
parsing. 
 
Over the past decade, dissatisfaction has been growing with the estimation of a 
cross-country “average relationship” leading to “best practice” policy guidelines which are 
common to all countries.  This view, that variations around the estimates of average 
relationships like (2) are not simply pure random variations, but reflect country specific 
factors that are not captured in our model and in our data, is powerfully put in a recent 
report from the World Bank itself, Economic Growth in the 1990s:  Learning from a 
Decade of Reform: 
 
“The Study concludes that valid general principles do not imply generic “best practice” policy or 
institutional solutions…. 
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Regarding macroeconomic policies for example, the findings emphasize the importance of 
institutions underlying macroeconomic stabilization, the risks associated with external financial liberalization, 
the disruptions associated with episodes of exchange rate appreciation, and the sometimes excessive focus on 
minimizing inflation in the short term…. 
Regarding trade, the analysis highlights the fact that countries that have successfully integrated into 
the world economy have followed different approaches and also adopted a range of complementary policies, 
making it difficult to pin down the exact relationship between trade integration and growth…. 
Perhaps the lesson of the lessons of the 1990s is that we need to get away from formulae and realize 
that economic policies and institutional reforms need to address whatever is the binding constraint on growth, 
at the right time, in the right manner, in the right sequence, instead of addressing any constraint at any 
time….” (World Bank, 2004b, pp vi-vii). 
 
No doubt this view, put forward by one team writing one report, will be debated 
heatedly within the World Bank and without.  But let me record here that I support the “end 
of certainty” heralded by this report.  In this context, then, what I want to highlight again is 
that the CPIA does not contain any final outcome variables like poverty, extreme poverty, 
girls’ enrollment, maternal mortality rates, infant mortality rates etc.  What it has instead is 
a series of intermediate variables like trade policy, regulatory policy, property rights, 
corruption, etc, which we hope will eventually influence the outcomes we are truly 
interested in.  In effect, it has an implicit model of the development process which says that 
if the scores on the categories in the CPIA improve, then development outcomes will 
improve, or rather, the productivity of aid will improve.  Over the years these categories 
have broadened and increased to 20, and then most recently decreased to 16, but the basic 
logic that we have the right and complete model, captured in the CPIA, has not changed. 
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And this is then the model that is implicitly assumed to be valid for every country to which 
the aid allocation formula applies. 
 
My contention is that the evidentiary basis for imposing across countries this 
implicit common model of the development process that supposedly leads to improvement 
in final outcomes, is weak.8  It is weak for growth, and it is weak for development 
outcomes.  Despite the support of the World Bank (2004b) report and the analysis therein, 
this may be interpreted as a controversial view, so let me be clear about what I am saying.  
I am not necessarily questioning that the model implicit in the CPIA is a good 
representation of the average across countries, although in other contexts I would question 
this as well.  Rather, what I am saying is that the country variations around this average, 
deriving from myriad country specificities that cannot be captured by outside data and 
outside observers, are large and complex.  How else can we explain the fact that 
Bangladesh, a country that far outstrips its comparators on improvement in social indicators 
in the last decade, is nevertheless at the top or near the top of Transparency International’s 
corruption index?  How else can we explain that once the fiscal deficit is in a range of, say, 
2 percent of GDP, further reductions do not necessarily contribute to increased investment 
and growth?  How else can we explain the fact that two countries can spend about the same 
amount on primary education, yet one country has higher enrollment rates and test scores?  
These variations are not due to random factors, but specific local factors that are not 
captured and perhaps cannot be fully captured in our models.  The problem lies not in 
estimating an average relationship given the data that we have; the problem lies in then 
using this average relationship to make country specific judgments. 
                                                 
8 Apart from World Bank (2004b), see the many references in Kanbur (2004a). 
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Lest I am misunderstood, let me clarify further.  There are certainly extreme 
situations, like hyperinflation, a double digit fiscal deficit ratio, a trade system rife with 
mutually inconsistent quantity controls, a production sector dominated by highly inefficient 
state enterprises, extremely low spending on education and health, etc, where general 
prescriptions about the direction of movement are indeed valid, although even here there 
may be pace and sequencing issues.  But in “normal” cases lessons drawn from the average 
relationships may well obscure the local specificities that determine the success of policies 
and interventions.  
 
So, in the face of these critiques of the underlying logic of the CPIA’s role in the 
allocation of IDA across countries, what is one to do?  The next section turns to this 
question. 
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4. Outcomes Based Aid Allocation: Criticisms and Responses 
 
 If the average cross-country relationships that underlie the CPIA procedure, and 
thus the IDA allocation formula, cannot truly capture the cross country variations in the 
productivity of aid, what is the alternative?  One alternative is of course to try even harder 
to capture country specific variations in estimating the relationship (2), with better data and 
more elaborate methods.  This is a fruitful line of enquiry, but it is not my focus.  Such 
further detailed investigation may never incorporate all country specific variations.  In any 
event, while that exercise is ongoing, we have a specific question about what to do with the 
IDA formula. 
 
The answer I propose, in an extreme and pure form to begin with, follows directly 
from expression (1), and is as follows.  The needs side of the story can be measured by the 
levels of the outcomes we are interested in, but the performance side can be measured by 
the rate of improvement of these very same outcome variables over a given period of time 
up to the point of assessment, suitably normalized by the total aid flow over this period.  A 
country that has very low levels of girls’ enrollment in primary schools should get more aid 
on grounds of need.  But a country that is showing rapid improvements of girls’ enrollment 
from this low level, relative to the aid it is receiving, should get even more.  A country that 
is showing relatively slow rates of improvement should get relatively less on account of 
this measure of performance. 
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In a purely conceptual sense I am arguing for an aid allocation formula that depends 
solely on outcomes for the very poor—levels to measure needs, change to measure 
performance.9  There are of course many criticisms, conceptual and operational, of this 
position. I want to rehearse a number of these, and present some responses. 
 
*Which outcome variables will be chosen?  
 
This is an important question, and focuses the donor’s attention on the true 
underlying objectives.  For all its problems, the MDG process has begun to forge an 
international consensus on these outcome variables.  But the lack of complete consensus on 
outcome variables seems to be an odd reason to move to intermediate variables—which 
have relevance presumably only because they will affect the outcomes we want favorably.  
If we do not know the outcomes we want, how can we know the intermediate variables that 
give rise to these outcomes? 
 
*How will the different outcome variables be combined together?  
 
Another good question.  This needs further discussion and consensus.  But note that 
the 20 (or 16 from 2004 onwards) CPIA scores are also aggregated together to form one 
index, with little justification for the method of aggregation (a simple unweighted sum). 
 
                                                 
9 The idea of using actual outcomes in guiding aid allocations is not at all new, of course. For an argument 
that leads to this proposition, from the earlier literature on the design of conditionality in adjustment lending, 
see Collier et. al. (1997). 
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*What about the “start up” problem?  A country coming out of conflict, for 
example, will be penalized because it cannot show a track record of performance on 
outcome variables.  
 
This is a generic issue no matter how we judge performance.  As noted in Section 2, 
the current IDA allocation process does indeed make special provisions for post-conflict 
countries.  There is no reason why these principles cannot continue to be used in the 
outcome based approach.  For example, other criteria could be used for a set period in these 
cases. 
 
*What about shocks and random events that can give a bad performance (or a good 
performance) in a year, independently of the government’s actions?  
 
Such variations can be handled in principle by taking time averages of the outcome 
variables—the averaging can be statistically as sophisticated as warranted.  It should be 
noted that shocks often are factored into the subjective judgments that go into the 
assessments of the sub-categories of the CPIA (for example, if the tariff reductions did not 
go as far as might have been hoped because of a revenue crisis stemming from a decline in 
commodity prices).  Moreover, allowances are made for natural disasters and the like in the 
current CPIA and similar procedures can surely be maintained. 
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*With this “backward looking” assessment of performance, can an incoming 
government not “live off” the achievements of its predecessor?  Should we not be holding 
each government accountable for its actions, and indeed trying to influence these?  
 
These questions embody the twin conceits that we from the outside know the 
specificities of what needs to be done, so we can then judge actions, and that the tail of 
outside development assistance can wag the dog of domestic political economy.  It should 
be clear from the discussion in the previous section that I am skeptical of both of these 
propositions. 
 
*What about the reverse problem, of a government that comes in after years not of 
conflict and collapse, but simple policy neglect of the poorest, and now wants to take this 
on as serious issue?  There is no track record of performance on outcomes, but the 
government wants to take actions which it claims will lead to improved outcomes—is this 
not another “start up” problem that deserves external support?  
 
I am sympathetic to this argument (note that it holds just as well with the current 
CPIA methodology), but at the same time I am wary of repeated “new dawn” arguments.  
But surely we can devise mechanisms to handle these cases by ring fencing limited funds 
for start up and then letting performance measurement on outcomes take over, just as we 
seem to do for the “new dawn” cases under the current methodology. 
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*What about data quality and availability for outcome variables?  Is this not 
notoriously bad?  How can we possibly run an aid allocation system based on such 
incomplete data?  
 
These are all valid points.  But, first, data for the current intermediate variables (e.g. 
property rights) are not problem free either.  Second, most importantly, we should be 
investing in monitoring of variables that we are truly interested in.  It is odd that we invest 
in collecting information in intermediate variables, but not on the outcome variables of 
ultimate interest.  But of course one of the reasons we do so is because the intermediate 
variables enter the aid allocation formulae!  This cycle has to be broken somewhere.  
Indeed, assistance for monitoring development outcomes for the poorest can be (almost) 
unconditional in any setting.  Interestingly, criterion #15 of the 2003 CPIA is “Monitoring 
and Analysis of Poverty Outcomes and Impacts.”  IDA is currently emphasizing 
measurement of development outcomes.  Although this exercise is currently seen as being 
outside of the CPIA process and IDA aid allocation process (indeed, monitoring as a 
separate criterion is not one of the 16 categories in the new 2004 VPIA—see Table 8), the 
emphasis on measurement and monitoring can only help if the objective is to make aid 
allocations more outcome based. 
 
*If we make aid allocation depend on performance measured by outcome variables, 
will there not be an incentive for the government to manipulate this information?  
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But this is true of any measure on which aid allocation will be based.  Measures of 
Domestic Credit Creation (a classic intermediate variable), for example, are not free of the 
possibility of manipulation.  This merely strengthens the argument for strong, locally based 
mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation. 
 
*Will not the focus just on the outcomes detract from an understanding of the 
development process—do we not need the intermediate variables for that?  
 
Nothing I have said stops us from analyzing the development process, developing 
models and learning the lessons from country experience.  And, indeed, we can convey 
those lessons from one country, say, to other countries.  But what the focus on outcomes 
does is that it prevents the easy temptation of saying that because X worked in country A, 
we will condition aid on X being done in country B.  In fact, it may be that country B tries 
Y and gets the same or better result.  If two countries are delivering the same improvement 
in outcomes using very different intermediate methods, that should be interesting to us as 
analysts, but as aid allocators there is a strong argument for treating the two countries the 
same. 
 
Where, then, do the criticism and responses leave us?  The next section proposes a 
resolution. 
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5. Conclusion: A Modest Proposal 
 
Thus, many of the criticisms of the pure proposal, to make the performance part of 
IDA’s aid allocation formula based solely on improvements in outcomes per unit of aid 
flow, apply equally to the current IDA process, and there are reasonable responses to all of 
the criticisms.  But the criticisms are nevertheless powerful, and suggest a carefully 
modulated move in the direction of outcome based allocation, learning and improving as 
we go along.  
 
My proposal is therefore as follows. 
 
 While leaving the current IDA allocation methodology essentially intact, IDA 
should introduce one new category of scoring in the CPIA.  This category should evaluate 
the evolution of an actual development outcome variable up to the present.  The choice of 
variable is open.  It will depend on international consensus and on data availability 
considerations, but surely the elements of the MDGs are likely candidates.  Once an 
outcome indicator is chosen, its evolution should be described using appropriate time 
series averaging techniques.  The rate of change of the averaged time series, per unit of aid 
flow, should then be scored in the same way as the other CPIA categories, from 1 to 6.  
Guidelines should be developed for this scoring, just as guidelines were developed for the 
current CPIA categories.  The equal weighting procedure would still be maintained to give 
the CPIA score.  All other aspects of the current IDA allocation procedure would be left 
unchanged by this proposal.  
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I hope that this proposal is seen as one that is practical and achievable.  It responds 
to basic concerns about the logic of the CPIA and the IDA allocation formula, and yet it is 
not a radical departure from the current procedure.  But to achieve it will require a fair 
amount of technical work to lay the background for choice of indicator, for the averaging 
technique, and for the guidelines on scoring.  This work can be done, but it will require that 
we start soon, in time for the next CPIA in 2005.  After three years, the experience can be 
assessed, and the possibilities for introducing new outcome variables (or indeed dropping 
them altogether) can be evaluated.  The fact that there is to be a standing expert committee 
on the CPIA (see World Bank 2004b) means that this work can be guided by that 
committee, which can also facilitate technical discussions and consensus building.  I 













2003 CPIA Categories 
 
A. Economic Management 
1. Management of Inflation and Macroeconomic Imbalances 
2. Fiscal Policy 
3. Management of Public Debt (External and Domestic) 
4. Management and Sustainability of the Development Program 
 
B. Structural Policies 
5. Trade Policy and Foreign Exchange Regime 
6 Financial Stability 
7 Financial Sector Depth, Efficiency and Resource Mobilization 
8. Competitive Environment for the Private Sector 
9. Goods and Factor Markets 
10. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 
11. Gender 
12. Equity of Public Resource Use 
13. Building Human Resources 
14. Social Protection and Labor 
15. Monitoring and Analysis of Poverty Outcomes and Impacts 
 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 
16. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 
17. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
18. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
19. Quality of Public Administration 
20. Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 














2003 CPIA Ratings Scale 
 
1 (low) through 6 (high) 
1 Unsatisfactory for an extended period 
2 Unsatisfactory 
3 Moderately Unsatisfactory 
4 Moderately Satisfactory 
5 Good 
6 Good for an extended period 
Intermediate scores of 2.5, 3.5 and 4.5 may also be given. 
Scores of 1.5 and 5.5 may not be given. 
 










2003 IDA Country Performance Ratings 
 
First Quintile Armenia, Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Ghana, Grenada, India, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Samoa, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Tanzania, Uganda 
 
Second Quintile Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Dominica, 
Guyana, Honduras, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of 
Yemen 
 
Third Quintile Albania, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Maldives, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Vietnam, Zambia 
 
Fourth Quintile Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea, Kiribati, Lao 
PDR, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan 
 
Fifth Quintile Angola, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Comoros, Guinea- 
Bissau, Haiti, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Sudan, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe 
 
Countries not rated in 2003 exercise: Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, and Timor- 
Leste. 
 
Note: Number of countries per quintile varies due to equal scores at cut-off levels. 
 







2003 CPIA: Score Guidelines for Fiscal Policy 
 
2     Fiscal balance will likely lead (or is already leading) to inflationary financing, crowding out of private 
sector investment, an unsustainable current account deficit or an unsustainable level of public debt; or fiscal 
policy is not making a serious attempt at provision of public services and infrastructure essential to growth 
. 
3    Sporadic efforts at macroeconomic stabilization through fiscal policy but not maintained consistently or 
implemented through temporary measures like ludicrously low real public sector wages or cuts in projects 
or services with high long run returns; or attempts at public services and infrastructure provision are 
sporadic and concentrated in not very cost-effective uses of funds. 
 
4   Consistent maintenance of macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability through appropriate levels 
of the fiscal balance and lasting adjustment measures with only occasional lapses. Public service provision 
is good in some sectors but still inadequate in others. 
 
5   Fiscal policies are consistent with adequate provision of high quality public services and infrastructure 
for economic growth and generate a fiscal balance that can be financed (including with aid flows where 
applicable) in a non-inflationary way and is consistent with adequate credit for the private sector and a 
sustainable path of public debt. 
 








2003 CPIA: Score Guidelines for Trade Policy and Foreign Exchange Regime 
 
 
2    Average tariff (weighted by global trade flows) is high (over 30%). High and erratic import and/or 
export barriers, including quantitative restrictions and/or state trading monopolies. Export taxes or 
quantitative restrictions frequently used. Customs or political authorities make discriminatory or ad hoc 
exemptions. Valuation procedures arbitrary and artificial exchange rates result in substantial over or under 
valuation of goods for customs purposes. Clearance of goods requires many approvals, arbitrary fines, 
frequent bribes to customs officials and involves long delays. Foreign exchange rationed or an administered 
foreign exchange regime with multiple exchange rates. 
 
3    Average tariff 20-30 percent. Coverage of quantitative restrictions reduced to 15 per cent or lower. 
Export restrictions mostly phased out. Duty exemptions frequently used to offset the adverse impacts of 
import barriers on inputs used in production of exports or for approved investment projects. Foreign 
exchange convertible for most current account purposes. Customs clearance involves high inspection ratios 
for imports, and interaction between officials and importers encourages corruption. 
 
4   Average tariff 10-20 percent. Quantitative restrictions cover only a very small percentage of imports 
(under 5 percent). Virtually no export restrictions. Duty exemptions provided only in accordance with well-
defined rules. Foreign exchange convertible for virtually all current account purposes. Customs procedures 
are well-defined, quick, efficient and impersonal, and staff professional, although some “tea money” 
payments to expedite clearance may still be present. 
 
5    Average tariff (weighted by global trade flows) is low (10% or less), with low dispersion and 
insignificant or no quantitative restrictions or export taxes. Trading monopolies absent or unimportant. 
Indirect taxes (e.g. sales, excise, surcharges) do not discriminate against imports or exports. Efficient and 
rule-bound customs administration. IMF Article 8 status. Minimal or no foreign exchange restrictions on 
long-term investment capital inflows. 
 








2003 CPIA Score Guidelines for Equity of Public Resource Use 
 
2   Most public expenditures for economic and social services do not benefit the poor more than the better 
off. The government has not identified individuals, groups or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have 
unequal access to services and opportunities, does not have appropriate programs, and has no plans. 
Spending on economic and social services targeted to the poor is inadequate. The overall incidence of 
revenues is regressive. 
 
3   Only some public expenditures for economic and social services benefit the poor more than the better 
off. The government has not identified individuals, groups or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have 
unequal access to services and opportunities, does not have appropriate programs, and has taken only small, 
if any, steps to correct this. Spending on some key economic services targeted to the poor is inadequate. 
The overall incidence of revenues is regressive and only small steps, if any, are being taken to correct this. 
 
4   Key public expenditures for economic and social services benefit the poor more than the better off, but 
some egregious regressive expenditures remain. The government has identified individuals, groups or 
localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities, and is taking 
significant steps to introduce appropriate programs. With few exceptions, spending on economic services 
targeted to the poor is broadly adequate. The overall incidence of revenues is progressive, but some 
egregious regressive revenue sources remain.  
 
5   Key public expenditures for economic and social services are well targeted to benefit the poor. There are 
few, if any, egregious regressive expenditures. The government has identified individuals, groups or 
localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities, and has designed 
appropriate programs. Spending on economic services targeted to the poor is broadly adequate. 
The overall incidence of revenues is progressive, and there are few, if any, egregious regressive revenue 
sources. 
 








2003 CPIA Score Guidelines for Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in 
the Public Sector 
 
 
2   There are no effective audit or other checks and balances on executive power. Boundaries between the 
public and private sector are ill-defined, and conflicts of interest abound. Responsibilities are not clearly 
defined across levels of government and the reasons for and costs of decisions by public officials and the 
judiciary are not made clear or are not based on legal rules or procedures. Laws and policies are biased 
towards narrow private interests, implementation of laws and policies is distorted by corruption and 
resources budgeted for public services are diverted to private gain. The media are not independent of 
government or powerful business interests. Public officials are not sanctioned for failures in service 
delivery or for receiving bribes. The general public has little voice or participation in public activities. 
 
3   Elected and other public officials often have private interests that conflict with their professional duties. 
Decision making is generally not transparent. External accountability mechanisms such as inspector-
general, ombudsman or independent audit may exist, but have inadequate resources or authority. 
Restrictions on the media limit its potential for information-gathering and scrutiny, and civil society is 
weak.  
 
4   External accountability mechanisms limit somewhat the degree to which special interests can divert 
resources or influence policy making through illicit and non-transparent means. Media publicity is an 
effective deterrent against unethical behavior. Risks and opportunities for corruption within the executive 
are reduced through adequate monitoring and reporting lines. Conflict of interest and ethics rules exist and 
the prospect of sanctions has some effect on the extent to which public officials shape policies to further 
their own private interests. Administrative corruption is low. 
 
5  Responsibilities are clearly defined across levels of government. Accountability for decisions is ensured 
through a strong public service ethic reinforced by audits, inspections, and adverse publicity for 
performance failures. The judiciary is impartial and independent of other branches of government. The 
reasons for decisions, and their results and costs, are clear and communicated to the general public. Citizens 
can obtain government documents at nominal cost. Conflict of interest and ethics rules for public servants 
are observed and enforced. Top government officials are required to disclose income and assets, and are not 
immune from prosecution under the law for malfeasance. Authorities monitor the prevalence of corruption 
and implement sanctions transparently. 
 








Revised 2004 CPIA Categories 
 
A. Economic Management 
1. Macroeconomic Management 
2. Fiscal Policy 
3. Debt Policy 
 
B. Structural Policies 
4. Trade 
5. Financial Sector 
6. Business Regulatory Environment 
 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 
7. Gender Equality 
8. Equity of Public Resource Use 
9. Building Human Resources 
10. Social Protection and Labor 
11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 
12. Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance 
13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
15. Quality of Public Administration 
16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
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